Arsenals of Folly, Richard Rhodes (ISBN 978-0-375-71394-1, Vintage Books)

The third book in the series on atomic weapons after ‘The making of the atomic bomb’ and ‘Dark Sun’. Chronologically it also covers the period after these 2 books and covers the nuclear arms race and the negotiations between Gorbatchev and Reagan that finally lead to several treaties that finally lead to a reduction in nuclear weapons. Compared to ‘Dark Sun’ this book had a more engaging story arc in my opinion and because it partly deals with more recent history after I was born it has a more direct link to personal experience. The book begins with the Chernobyl accident and how it influenced Gorbatchev’s thinking about nuclear bombs and started him on the path to the Reykjavik summit. The summit and the treaties that came out of it after a lengthy process were covered in detail in the news of the time but Rhodes interviewed some of the people involved in the negotiations on both sides. He describes what happened behind the scenes and how certain parties on both sides tried to obstruct a deal. We read how Donald Rumsfeld and Dick Cheney were involved and invented a certain narrative that they later rehashed to motivate the invasion of Irak. All very interesting to understand what happened in other arenas later on and what is going on today. When Rhodes wrote the book in 2008 there was a positive outlook on nuclear arms control. Unfortunately, we have had the invasion of Ukraine by Putin in the meantime and the ending of the last nuclear arms control agreement in February 2026. Donald Trump pledged to replace it with something better and undefined while Putin stated he was ready for a renewed nuclear arms race without limits. It appears the leaders of today have forgotten yesterday’s lessons. If Rhodes’ analysis is correct then the best case outcome of a renewed nuclear arms race will be the financial ruin of both Russia and the US. Unfortunately the behaviour of today’s rulers doesn’t inspire a lot of confidence and it isn’t too far fetched to imagine that one of them manages to convince himself of the fallacy that a nuclear war can be won.